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Abstract
We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has
dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and
(strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number
of agents. For the endowment only model, one of the algorithms also returns a
core-stable allocation.
Keywords: House allocation, Housing markets, Core, Top Trading Cycles,
Dichotomous preferences
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1. Introduction
We consider a setting in which there is a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n},
set of houses H = {h1, . . . , hm}, each agent owns at most one and possibly zero
houses from H and there may be houses that are not owned by any agent. In the
literature the setting is termed as house allocation with existing tenants [1, 13].
If each agent owns exactly one house and each house is owned, the setting is
equivalent to the housing market setting [3, 10, 12]. If no agent owns a house,
the setting is equivalent to the house allocation model [6, 14].
The setting captures various allocations settings including allocation of dor-
mitory rooms as well as kidney exchange markets. We consider housing market
with existing tenants setting with the assumption that each agent has dichoto-
mous preferences with utility zero or one.
Dichotomous preferences are prevalent in many settings. A kidney may ei-
ther be compatible or incompatible for a patient. A dormitory room may within
budget or outside budget for a student. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] give nu-
merous other examples where dichotomous preferences make sense in allocation
and matching problems. Interestingly, since dichotomous preferences require
indifference in preferences, they are not covered by many models considered in
the literature that assume strict preferences [1, 13]. If a house is maximally
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preferred, we will refer to it as an acceptable house. If an agent gets a house
that is maximally preferred, we will say that the agent is satisfied.
We consider the standard normative properties in market design: (i) Pareto
optimality: there should be no allocation in which each agent is at least as happy
and at least one agent is strictly happier (ii) individual rationality (IR): no agent
should have an incentive to leave the allocation program (iii) strategyproofness :
no agent should have an incentive to misreport his preferences. We also consider
a stronger notion of individual rationality that requires that either an agent
keeps his endowment or gets some house that is strictly better. Finally, we
consider a property stronger than Pareto optimality: maximizing the number of
agents who are satisfied. If we rephrase dichotomous preferences in terms of 1-0
utilities, the goal is equivalent to maximizing social welfare. Under 1-0 utilities,
an allocation maximizes welfare if a maximum number of agents get utility 1
or in other words a maximum number of agents are satisfied. Throughout the
paper, when we talk about welfare, we will assume that the underlying cardinal
utilities are 1-0.
The main results are as follows:
Theorem 1. For house allocation with existing tenants with dichotomous pref-
erences, there exists an algorithm (MSIR) that is polynomial-time, strategyproof,
and allocates maximally preferred houses to a maximum number of agents sub-
ject to strong individual rationality. In the endowment setting in which each
house is initially owned by an agent, the mechanisms are core stable.
Theorem 2. For house allocation with existing tenants with with dichotomous
preferences, there exists an algorithm (MIR) that is polynomial-time, strate-
gyproof, allocates maximally preferred houses to a maximum number of agents,
and is Pareto optimal.
2. Related Work
House allocation with existing tenants model was introduced by Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez [1]. They assumed that agents have strict preferences and
introduced mechanism that are individually rational, Pareto optimal and strat-
egyproof. The results do not apply to the setting with dichotomous preferences
In the restricted model of housing market, Jaramillo and Manjunath [7] pro-
posed a mechanism called TCR that is polynomial-time, individually rational,
Pareto optimal and strategyproof even if agents have indifferences. The results
imply the same result for dichotomous preferences.
Another natural approach to allocation problems is to satisfy the maximum
number of agents by computing a maximum weight matching. However, such an
approach violates individual rationality. Krysta et al. [9] proposed algorithms
for house allocation with 1-0 utility. However their algorithms are for the model
in which agents do not have any endowment.
For kidney exchange with 1-0 utilities, Abraham et al. [2] and Biro et al. [4]
presented an algorithm that is strongly individually rational and satisfies the
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maximum number of agents. The algorithm does not cater for the cases where
agents own acceptable houses, or there may be houses that are not owned by any
agents. Furthermore, they did not establish strategyproofness or core stability
of their mechanism.
3. Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n agents and H = {h1, . . . , hm} a set of m
houses. The endowment function ω : N → H assigns to each agent the house he
originally owns. Each agent has complete and transitive preferences %i over the
houses and %= (%1, . . . %n) is the preference profile of the agents. The housing
market is a quadruple M = (N,H, e,%). For S ⊆ N , we denote
⋃
i∈S
{e(i)} by
e(S). A function x : S → H is an allocation on S ⊆ N if there exists a function
pi on S such that x(i) = e(pi(i)) for each i ∈ S. The goal in housing markets is
to re-allocate the houses in a mutually beneficial and efficient way.
Since we consider dichotomous preferences, we will denote by Ai the set of
houses maximally preferred by i ∈ N . These houses are acceptable to i whereas
the other houses are unacceptable to i. Agent i is satisfied when he gets an
acceptable house. Since we consider welfare as well, we will assume that that
acceptable houses give utility one to the agent and unacceptable houses give
utility zero. Hence getting an unacceptable house is equivalent to not getting a
house.
An allocation x is individually rational (IR) if x(i) %i e(i) for all i ∈ N An
allocation x is strongly individually rational (S-IR) if x(i) = e(i) or x(i) ≻i (e(i))
for all i ∈ N .
A coalition S ⊆ N blocks an allocation x on N if there exists an allocation y
on S such that for all i ∈ S, y(i) ∈ e(S) and y(i) ≻i x(i). An allocation x on N
is in the core (C) of market M if it admits no blocking coalition. An allocation
that is in the core is also said to be core stable. A coalition S ⊆ N weakly blocks
an allocation x on N if there exists an allocation y on S such that for all i ∈ S,
y(i) ∈ e(S), y(i) %i x(i), and there exists an i ∈ S such that y(i) ≻i x(i). An
allocation x on N is in the strict core (SC) of market M if it admits no weakly
blocking coalition. An allocation that is in the strict core is also said to be strict
core stable. An allocation is Pareto optimal (PO) if N is not a weakly blocking
coalition. It is clear that strict core implies core and also Pareto optimality.
Core implies weak Pareto optimality and also individual rationality.
From now on we will assume 1-0 utilities for all the statements.
Example 1. Consider a house allocation with existing tenants setting:
• N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
• H = {h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6};
• e(i) = hi for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4};
• A1 = {h2}; A2 = {h3}; A3 = {h1}, A4 = {h5}, A5 = {h5, h6}
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Then a feasible SIR outcome and Pareto optimal outcome is allocation x such
that x(1) = h2, x(2) = h3, x(3) = h1, x(4) = h4, and x(5) = h5.
Then a feasible IR outcome and Pareto optimal outcome is allocation y such
that y(1) = h2, y(2) = h3, y(3) = h1, y(4) = h5, and y(5) = h6.
It is obvious that S-IR implies IR.
Proposition 1. S-IR implies IR.
Proposition 2. An allocation that maximizes welfare subject to S-IR may have
less welfare than an allocation that maximizes welfare subject to IR.
Proof. Consider the setting in which there are two agents and both agents have
zero value houses but one agent wants the other agent’s house. Then the only
feasible S-IR allocation is e whereas there exists an IR allocation in which one
agents gets an acceptable house with utility 1.
4. Mechanisms
We present two mechanisms: MSIR and MIR. MSIR satisfies the maximum
number of agents subject to the SIR constraint. MIR satisfies the maximum
number of agents subject to the IR constraint. Both algorithms are based on
constructing a bipartite graph that admits a perfect matching and repeatedly
modifying the graph while still ensuring the the graph still has a maximum
weight perfect matching.
4.1. The MSIR Mechanism
The MSIR mechanism is specified as Algorithm 1.
Proposition 3. MSIR runs in polynomial-time.
Proof. The graph G has O(n+m) vertices. The graph is modified at most O(n)
times. Each time, a maximum weight perfect matching is computed that takes
polynomial time |V (G)|3 [8].
Proposition 4. MSIR returns an allocation that is SIR.
Proof. Throughout the algorithm, we make sure that G admits a perfect match-
ing. If a modification to G leads to a lack of a perfect matching, then such a
modification is reversed. An agent with an endowment only has an edge to
his endowment or to an acceptable house. Therefore while a perfect matching
exists, an agent with an unacceptable endowment cannot be matched to an un-
acceptable house other than his endowment. Thus MSR returns an allocation
that is SIR.
Proposition 5. MSIR returns an allocation that satisfies the maximum number
of agents subject to SIR.
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Algorithm 1 MSIR
Input: (N,H,%, e)
Output:
1 G = (A ∪ B,E,w). Set k to |n −m|. If m > n, then A = N ∪ DN where
DN = {d1, . . . , dk}. If n > m, then B = H ∪DH where DH = {o1, . . . , ok}.
E is defined as follows:
• For a ∈ N and b = e(a), add {a, b} ∈ E with w({a, b}) = 0 if b /∈ Aa
and w({a, b}) = 1 if b ∈ Aa.
• For a ∈ N such that e(a) 6= null, e(a) /∈ Aa, and b = H \ {e(a)} such
that b ∈ Aa, add {a, b} ∈ E with w({a, b}) = 1.
• For a ∈ N such that e(a) = null and b ∈ B, add {a, b} ∈ E with
w({a, b}) = 0 if b /∈ Aa and w({a, b}) = 1 if b ∈ Aa.
• For b ∈ DH and a ∈ {a ∈ N : e(a) = null}, add {a, b} ∈ E with
w({a, b}) = 0 if b /∈ Ai and w({a, b}) = 1 if b ∈ Aa.
• For a ∈ DN and each b ∈ B, add {a, b} ∈ E with w({a, b}) = 0.
{Note that an agent with an acceptable endowment only has an edge to
his endowment. An agent with an unacceptable endowment only has edges
with his endowment as well as the acceptable houses.}
2 Compute the maximum weight perfect matching of G. Let the weight of
the matching be W .
3 Take permutation pi of N
4 for i=1 to n do
5 Set ti to 1.
6 Remove from G each edge {pi(i), b} ∈ E such that w({pi(i), b)}) = 0.
Compute the maximum weight perfect matching of G. If the weight is
less than W or if there does not exist a perfect matching, then put back
the removed edges and set ti to 0.
7 end for
8 Compute the maximum weight perfect matching M of G. Consider the
allocation x in which each agent i ∈ N gets a house that it is matched to in
M . If i ∈ N is matched to a dummy house, its allocation is null.
9 return (x(1), . . . , x(n))
Proof. Throughout the algorithm, we make sure that G admits a perfect match-
ing which ensures that the corresponding allocation satisfies S-IR. An agent
with an acceptable endowment does not have an edge to any other house so
he has to be allocated his endowment. An agent with an unacceptable endow-
ment either has an edge to his endowment or to houses that are acceptable.
Hence, in a perfect matching, the agent either gets his endowment or an ac-
ceptable house. Given this condition, we compute the maximum weight perfect
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matching. This implies that the corresponding allocation satisfies the maximum
number of agents under the SIR constraint.
Corollary 1. MSIR returns an allocation that is Pareto optimal among the set
of SIR allocations.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the MSIR allocation is Pareto dominated
by an SIR allocation. But this means that the MSIR allocation does not satisfy
the maximum number of agents.
Proposition 6. MSIR is strategyproof.
Proof. MSIR returns a perfect matching of weight W . During the running
of MSIR, each time a modification is made to the graph G, it is is ensured
that G admits a perfect matching of weight W . Assume for contradiction that
MSIR is not strategyproof and some agent i ∈ N with turn k in permutation
pi gets a more preferred house when he misreports. This means that agent i
gets an unacceptable house when he reports the truthful preference Ai. Let
the allocation be x. This implies that in permutation pi, when i’s turn comes,
there exists no feasible maximum weight perfect matching of size W in which
i gets an acceptable house and each agent preceding i in permutation pi gets ti
acceptable houses. Since i can get a more preferred house by misreporting, i
gets an acceptable house if he reports A′
i
. Let such an allocation be x′. Note
that x′ is a feasible maximum weight perfect matching even when i tells the
truth and even if each agent preceding i in permutation pi gets ti acceptable
houses. But this is a contradiction because there does exist a feasible maximum
weight perfect matching of size W in which i gets an acceptable house and each
agent preceding i in permutation pi gets ti acceptable houses.
Lemma 1. For 1-0 utilities, any S-IR welfare maximizing allocation is core
stable.
Proof. Assume that there is a blocking coalition S. It can only consist of agents
who did not get an acceptable house in the allocation. S-IR implies that agents
who originally own an acceptable house keep the acceptable house. If an agent
i ∈ N is in S who does not originally own any house, he cannot be part of S
because he nas nothing to give to other agents, so other agents can satisfy each
other without letting i be a member of S. Therefore, S consists of those agents
who owned an unacceptable house and are allocated an unacceptable house.
Due to S-IR, agents in S are allocated their own house. Now if S admits a
blocking coalition this implies that the S-IR welfare maximizing allocation was
not S-IR welfare maximizing which is a contradiction.
Proposition 7. MIR returns an allocation that is core stable.
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Algorithm 2 MIR
Input: (N,H,%, e)
Output:
1 G = (A ∪ B,E,w). Set k to |n −m|. If m > n, then A = N ∪ DN where
DN = {d1, . . . , dk}. If n > m, then B = H ∪DH where DH = {o1, . . . , ok}.
E is defined as follows:
• For a ∈ N and b = e(a), add {a, b} ∈ E with w({a, b}) = 0 if b /∈ Aa
and w({a, b}) = 1 if b ∈ Aa.
• For a ∈ N and b = H \ {e(a)} such that b ∈ Aa, add {a, b} ∈ E with
w({a, b}) = 1.
• For a ∈ N such that e(a) = null and b ∈ B, add {a, b} ∈ E with
w({a, b}) = 0 if b /∈ Aa and w({a, b}) = 1 if b ∈ Aa.
• For a ∈ N such that e(a) = h and h /∈ Aa and each b ∈ B, add
{a, b} ∈ E with with w({a, b}) = 0 if b /∈ Aa and w({a, b}) = 1 if
b ∈ Aa.
• For b ∈ DH and each a ∈ {a ∈ N : e(a) /∈ Aa}, add {a, b} ∈ E with
w({a, b}) = 0.
• For a ∈ DN and each b ∈ B, add {a, b} ∈ E with w({a, b}) = 0.
{Note that an agent with an acceptable endowment only has an edge to
his endowment or to an acceptable house. An agent with an unacceptable
endowment has an edge to every b ∈ B.}
2 Compute the maximum weight perfect matching of G. Let the weight of
the matching be W .
3 Take permutation pi of N
4 for i=1 to n do
5 Set ti to 1.
6 Remove from G each edge {pi(i), b} ∈ E such that w({pi(i), b)}) = 0.
Compute the maximum weight perfect matching of G. If the weight is
less than W or if there does not exist a perfect matching, then put back
the removed edges and set ti to 0.
7 end for
8 Compute the maximum weight perfect matching M of G. Consider the
allocation x in which each agent i ∈ N gets a house that it is matched to in
M . If i ∈ N is matched to a dummy house, its allocation is null.
9 return (x(1), . . . , x(n))
4.2. The MIR Mechanism
The MSIR mechanism is specified as Algorithm 2.
Proposition 8. MIR runs in polynomial-time.
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Proof. The graph G has O(n+m) vertices. The graph is modified at most O(n)
times. Each time, a maximum weight perfect matching is computed that takes
time |V (G)|3 [8].
Proposition 9. MIR returns an allocation that is IR.
Proof. Throughout the algorithm, we make sure that G admits a perfect match-
ing. If a modification to G leads to a lack of a perfect matching, then such a
modification is reversed. An agent with an acceptable endowment only has an
edge to his endowment or to other acceptable houses. Therefore while a perfect
matching exists, an agent with an acceptable endowment can only be matched
to an acceptable house. Thus MSR returns an allocation that is IR.
Proposition 10. MIR returns an allocation that satisfies the maximum number
of agents subject to IR.
Proof. Throughout the algorithm, we make sure that G admits a perfect match-
ing which ensures that the corresponding allocation satisfies IR. Given this con-
dition, we compute the maximum weight perfect matching. This implies that
the corresponding allocation satisfies the maximum number of agents under the
IR constraint.
Lemma 2. An allocation that maximizes welfare subject subject to IR has the
same welfare even if IR is not imposed.
Proof. Let the set of agents who own an acceptable house be A and B is N \A.
Then an allocation with maximum welfare subject to IR is one that satisfies
each agent in A and maximum number of agents c in B. Let us assume that
without requiring IR, the welfare is more than |A| + c. Then this means that
there is an allocation that does not satisfy k agents in A but satisfies c+ k + 1
agents in B. But this means that by not satisfying k agents in A, k+1 agents in
B can be satisfied. But this is a contradiction because the sacrificing k agents
in A can forego exactly k houses for agents in B.
Proposition 11. MIR returns an allocation that satisfies the maximum number
of agents.
Corollary 2. MIR returns an allocation that is Pareto optimal.
Proof. MIR returns an allocation that is Pareto optimal among the set of IR
allocations. Now if the allocation were not Pareto optimal, any allocation that
Pareto dominated it would be IR as well. But this is a contradiction.
Proposition 12. MIR is strategyproof.
Proof. MIR returns a perfect matching of weight W . During the running of
MIR, each time a modification is made to the graph G, it is is ensured that G
admits a perfect matching of weight W . Assume for contradiction that MSIR
is not strategyproof and some agent i ∈ N with turn k in permutation pi gets
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a more preferred house when he misreports. This means that agent i gets
an unacceptable house when he reports the truthful preference Ai. Let the
allocation be x. This implies that in permutation pi, when i’s turn comes,
there exists no feasible maximum weight perfect matching of size W in which
i gets an acceptable house and each agent preceding i in permutation pi gets ti
acceptable houses. Since i can get a more preferred house by misreporting, i
gets an acceptable house if he reports A′i. Let such an allocation be x
′. Note
that x′ is a feasible maximum weight perfect matching even when i tells the
truth and even if each agent preceding i in permutation pi gets ti acceptable
houses. But this is a contradiction because there does exist a feasible maximum
weight perfect matching of size W in which i gets an acceptable house and each
agent preceding i in permutation pi gets ti acceptable houses.
Proposition 13. For 1-0 utilities, an IR welfare maximizing allocation may
not be core stable.
Proof. Consider a four agent setting in which each agent owns a house unac-
ceptable to himself. Agent 2 owns a house that is acceptable to 4 and 1 and
agent 1 owns a house that is acceptable to 2 and 3. Consider an allocation in
which agent 3 gets 1’s house and 4 gets 2’s house. Such an allocation is IR and
satisfies the maximum number of agents. However, it is not core stable because
1 and 2 can form a blocking coalition.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, two new mechanisms called MSIR and MIR were introduced.
See Table 1 for a summary of properties satisfied by different mechanisms for
house allocation with existing tenants.
MSIR MIR
S-IR + -
IR + +
Core + -
Pareto optimal - +
Max welfare subject to SIR + -
Max welfare subject to IR - +
Max welfare - +
Table 1: Properties satisfied by mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants with
dichotomous preferences.
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